Detail page

Knowledge Web

Person

Michael Finus (1965-)

Wirtschaftswissenschaftler

Name	Michael Finus
Time	1965- (Date of birth and death)
Place	Deutschland
Gender	männlich
Academic degree	Prof. Dr.
Profession	Wirtschaftswissenschaftler (characteristic profession)
Variant	M. Finus
Related	Universität Graz. Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre University of Bath University of Exeter. Business School (2009-2011) FernUniversität in Hagen (2001-2007) University of Stirling (2007-2009)
Further information	Dipl.-Ing. agr.; tätig am Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftstheorie, FernUniv. Hagen; am Inst. für Agrarpolitik und Marktforschung der Univ. Gießen
Source	LCAuth Homepage: http://www.bath.ac.uk/economics/staff/michael-finus/#group_article
Record type	Person
GND-Identifier	112995519
Record ID	112995519
Involved in show all On the credibility of threats to avoid the deployment of solar geoengineering The Corona-Pandemic: A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Regional and Global Governance Uncertainty, Learning and International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Risk Aversion Game Theory and Environmental and Resource Economics—In Honour of Alfred Endres, Part Two International environmental agreements with uncertainty, learning and risk aversion Self-enforcing agreements in international fisheries management The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement Game theoretic research on the design of international environment agreements: insights, critical remarks and future challenges Game theoretic research on the design of international environmental agreements New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming A Micro Foundation of Core Stability in Positive-Externality Coalition Games Das Göteborg Protokoll zur Bekämpfung grenzüberschreitender Luftschadstoffe in Europa : eine ökonomische und spieltheoretische Evaluierung The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements Do abatement quotas lead to more successful climate coalitions? Modesty pays: sometimes! Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements A non cooperative foundation of core stability in positive externality NTU coalition games Coalition formation in a global warming game : how the design of protocols affects the success of environmental treaty making Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game The effect of membership rules and votig schemes on the success of international climate agreements Quotas May Beat Taxes in a Global Emission Game The formation of coalitions in international pollution control Endogenous coalition formation in global pollution control : a partition function approach Sequential move unanimity equilibria in a public good model Symbolische Umweltpolitik im Zeitalter der Globalisierung? – Zur Effektivität internationaler Umweltverträge aus ökonomischer Sicht Game theory and international environmental cooperation: any practical application? Kooperative Lösungen in der Umweltpolitik : ökonomische Analysen am Beispiel des Schutzes der globalen Umweltressourcen Strategic links between environmental and trade policies if plant location is endogenous Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control A convention on greenhouse gases : the impact of instrumental choice on the success of negotiations International environmental agreements : how the policiy instrument affects equilibrium emissions and welfare ; (contributed paper of the conference of the European Economic Association in Istanbul, 21 - 24 August 1996) Playing a better global warming game: does it help to be green? Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a global emission game : when players are impatient Strategic trade policy and environment : divergent or convergent interests of industry, consumers and environmentalists? ; Paper contributed to the ninth annual congress of the European Economic Association, Maastricht, September 3 - 5, 1994 Der Reisekostenansatz : Darstellung, methodische Probleme und Anwendungsmöglichkeiten Ansätze zur Messung des Wertes von Umweltgütern in der Landwirtschaft : methodische Grundlagen und einige Gedanken zur Anwendbarkeit in der Agrarpolitik

Please note

The beta version does not yet contain all functions and information of the DNB portal catalogue. If you are missing information or want to order a medium, please visit the page in the DNB portal catalogue via the following link:

Katalog der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek

Michael Finus (1965-)

On the credibility of threats to avoid the deployment of solar geoengineering

The Corona-Pandemic: A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Regional and Global Governance

Uncertainty, Learning and International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Risk Aversion

Game Theory and Environmental and Resource Economics—In Honour of Alfred Endres, Part Two

International environmental agreements with uncertainty, learning and risk aversion

Self-enforcing agreements in international fisheries management

The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement

Game theoretic research on the design of international environment agreements: insights, critical remarks and future challenges

Game theoretic research on the design of international environmental agreements

New roads to international environmental agreements: the case of global warming

A Micro Foundation of Core Stability in Positive-Externality Coalition Games

Das Göteborg Protokoll zur Bekämpfung grenzüberschreitender Luftschadstoffe in Europa : eine ökonomische und spieltheoretische Evaluierung

The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements

Do abatement quotas lead to more successful climate coalitions?

Modesty pays: sometimes!

Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements

A non cooperative foundation of core stability in positive externality NTU coalition games

Coalition formation in a global warming game : how the design of protocols affects the success of environmental treaty making

Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game

The effect of membership rules and votig schemes on the success of international climate agreements

Quotas May Beat Taxes in a Global Emission Game

The formation of coalitions in international pollution control

Endogenous coalition formation in global pollution control : a partition function approach

Sequential move unanimity equilibria in a public good model

Symbolische Umweltpolitik im Zeitalter der Globalisierung? – Zur Effektivität internationaler Umweltverträge aus ökonomischer Sicht

Game theory and international environmental cooperation: any practical application?

Kooperative Lösungen in der Umweltpolitik : ökonomische Analysen am Beispiel des Schutzes der globalen Umweltressourcen

Strategic links between environmental and trade policies if plant location is endogenous

Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control

Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control

A convention on greenhouse gases : the impact of instrumental choice on the success of negotiations

International environmental agreements : how the policiy instrument affects equilibrium emissions and welfare ; (contributed paper of the conference of the European Economic Association in Istanbul, 21 - 24 August 1996)

Playing a better global warming game: does it help to be green?

Renegotiation-proof equilibria in a global emission game : when players are impatient

Strategic trade policy and environment : divergent or convergent interests of industry, consumers and environmentalists? ; Paper contributed to the ninth annual congress of the European Economic Association, Maastricht, September 3 - 5, 1994

Der Reisekostenansatz : Darstellung, methodische Probleme und Anwendungsmöglichkeiten

Ansätze zur Messung des Wertes von Umweltgütern in der Landwirtschaft : methodische Grundlagen und einige Gedanken zur Anwendbarkeit in der Agrarpolitik