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Klaus M. Schmidt (1961-)

Wirtschaftswissenschaftler

Name	Klaus M. Schmidt
Time	1961- (Date of birth and death)
Place	Deutschland
Gender	männlich
Academic degree	Prof. Dr.
Profession	Wirtschaftswissenschaftler (characteristic profession) Hochschullehrer
Variant	Klaus Schmidt
Related	Verein für Socialpolitik Centre for Economic Policy Research CESifo GmbH Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät (Professor für Wirtschaft) (1995-) Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn (Wissenschaftlicher Assistent) (1987-1995) Wirtschaftstheorie (Thema)
Source	https://sites.google.com/view/klaus-m-schmidt/ (Stand: 09.12.2024)
Record type	Person
GND-Identifier	12495278X
Record ID	12495278X
Involved in show all Wirtschaft verstehen, Zukunft gestalten : 150 Jahre Verein für Socialpolitik A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations Nachhaltigkeit in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Paying for open access A CO2-border adjustment mechanism as a building block of a climate club A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations Das Design von Klimaschutzverhandlungen Focusing Climate Negotiations on a Uniform Common Commitment Can Promote Cooperation Information and communication - essays on review systems, front-of-package labelling and unstructured bargaining Paying for Open Access Prices versus Quantities with Morally Concerned Consumers The behavioral economics of incentives : theory and evidence Three essays in theoretical economics Organizational design and individual behavior Genome-wide association analyses of risk tolerance and risky behaviors in over 1 million individuals identify hundreds of loci and shared genetic influences Bayesian Implementation and Rent Extraction in a Multi-Dimensional Procurement Problem Behavioral biases in dynamic choice : theory and evidence Time-inconsistency, commitment, and learning Auctions versus Negotiations Competition and Incentives Morals, markets, and malleability : three essays in behavioral economics Pay What You Want as a Pricing Model for Open Access Publishing? Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies Social networks, optimal contract design, and present bias : four essays in applied economic theory The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Contract Theory Vertragstheorie: Ökonomie-Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström Cartels, patent pools and the incentive effect of competition Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price? Firm behaviour under uncertainty and legal challenges "Pay what you want" as a marketing strategy in monopolistic and competitive markets Auctions vs. Negotiations:The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction Communication, delegation and performance evaluation in organizations Image concerns and behavioral implications : three essays in experimental economics Three essays in economic internet and field experiments Use and abuse of authority - a behavioral foundation of the employment relation A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation Behavior under Risk and in Social Dilemmas : Theoretical and Experimental Approaches Discretion, Productivity and Work Satisfaction Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction Essays on financial economics and the cost of incentives Loss aversion and ex post inefficient renegotiation Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition Use and Abuse of Authority You owe me You Owe Me Screening, Competition, and Job Design Screening, Competition, and Job Design : Economic Origins of Good Jobs Screening, competition, and job design: economic origins of good jobs Social Preferences and Competition Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools Complementary Patents and Market Structure Licensing Complementary Patents: “Patent Trolls”, Market Structure, and “Excessive” Royalties On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked Screening, Competition, and Job Design Economic Origins of Good Jobs Social Preferences and Competition

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Katalog der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek

Klaus M. Schmidt (1961-)

Wirtschaft verstehen, Zukunft gestalten : 150 Jahre Verein für Socialpolitik

A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations

Nachhaltigkeit in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft

Paying for open access

A CO2-border adjustment mechanism as a building block of a climate club

A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations

Das Design von Klimaschutzverhandlungen

Focusing Climate Negotiations on a Uniform Common Commitment Can Promote Cooperation

Information and communication - essays on review systems, front-of-package labelling and unstructured bargaining

Paying for Open Access

Prices versus Quantities with Morally Concerned Consumers

The behavioral economics of incentives : theory and evidence

Three essays in theoretical economics

Organizational design and individual behavior

Genome-wide association analyses of risk tolerance and risky behaviors in over 1 million individuals identify hundreds of loci and shared genetic influences

Bayesian Implementation and Rent Extraction in a Multi-Dimensional Procurement Problem

Behavioral biases in dynamic choice : theory and evidence

Time-inconsistency, commitment, and learning

Auctions versus Negotiations

Competition and Incentives

Morals, markets, and malleability : three essays in behavioral economics

Pay What You Want as a Pricing Model for Open Access Publishing?

Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies

Social networks, optimal contract design, and present bias : four essays in applied economic theory

The 2016 Nobel Memorial Prize in Contract Theory

Vertragstheorie: Ökonomie-Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström

Cartels, patent pools and the incentive effect of competition

Delegating Pricing Power to Customers: Pay What You Want or Name Your Own Price?

Firm behaviour under uncertainty and legal challenges

"Pay what you want" as a marketing strategy in monopolistic and competitive markets

Auctions vs. Negotiations:The Effects of Inefficient Renegotiation

Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction

Communication, delegation and performance evaluation in organizations

Image concerns and behavioral implications : three essays in experimental economics

Three essays in economic internet and field experiments

Use and abuse of authority - a behavioral foundation of the employment relation

A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation

A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation

Behavior under Risk and in Social Dilemmas : Theoretical and Experimental Approaches

Discretion, Productivity and Work Satisfaction

Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction

Essays on financial economics and the cost of incentives

Loss aversion and ex post inefficient renegotiation

Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets

Pay What You Want as a Marketing Strategy in Monopolistic and Competitive Markets

Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition

Reference Points in Renegotiations: The Role of Contracts and Competition

Use and Abuse of Authority

You owe me

You Owe Me

Screening, Competition, and Job Design

Screening, Competition, and Job Design : Economic Origins of Good Jobs

Screening, competition, and job design: economic origins of good jobs

Social Preferences and Competition

Standards, Innovation Incentives, and the Formation of Patent Pools

Complementary Patents and Market Structure

Licensing Complementary Patents: “Patent Trolls”, Market Structure, and “Excessive” Royalties

On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked

Screening, Competition, and Job Design Economic Origins of Good Jobs

Social Preferences and Competition