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Christian Wey (1967-)

Wirtschaftswissenschaftler

Name	Christian Wey
Time	1967- (Date of birth and death)
Place	Deutschland
Academic degree	Prof. Dr. rer. pol.
Profession	Wirtschaftswissenschaftler (characteristic profession) Hochschullehrer Diplomkaufmann
Variant	C. Wey
Related	Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Centre for Economic Policy Research Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf. Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf. Professur für VWL, insb. Wettbewerbs- und Regulierungsökonomik
Further information	2003 Habilitation an der Humboldt Universität Berlin; 1998 Promotion zum Dr. rer. pol. an der Universität des Saarlands, Saarbrücken; 1997 MA (Economics) an der Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA; 1993 Dipl.-Kaufmann (entspricht MBA) der Universität des Saarlands, Saarbrücken; bis 2010 Professor im Fachgebiet Netzwerke und IuK-Ökonomie an der Technischen Universität Berlin und Leiter der Abteilung Informationsgesellschaft und Wettbewerb am Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW); anschließend Professor für Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Universität Düsseldorf, Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Wettbewerbs- und Regulierungsökonomie am Institut für Wettbewerbsökonomie (DICE) und Partner der DICE Consult GmbH, Düsseldorf
Source	https://www.dice.hhu.de/diceteam/professorinnen-und-professoren/wey (Stand: 14.12.2023)
Record type	Person
GND-Identifier	136671993
Record ID	136671993
Involved in show all Resale price maintenance in a successive monopoly model Why “energy price brakes” encourage moral hazard, raise energy prices, and reinforce energy savings Why “Energy Price Brakes” Encourage Moral Hazard, Raise Energy Prices, and Reinforce Energy Savings A bargaining perspective on vertical integration A Bargaining Perspective on Vertical Integration Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies Evidence Production in Merger Control : The Role of Remedies On the social welfare effects of runner-up mergers in concentrated markets On the Social Welfare Effects of Runner-up Mergers in Concentrated Markets Third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly when markets are covered Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly When Markets Are Covered Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power Multi-Product Bargaining, Bundling, and Buyer Power Flexibility in wage setting under the threat of relocation Flexibility in Wage Setting Under the Threat of Relocation One-stop shopping behavior, buyer power, and upstream merger incentives One-Stop Shopping Behavior, Buyer Power, and Upstream Merger Incentives Uncertain merger synergies, passive partial ownership, and merger control Uncertain Merger Synergies, Passive Partial Ownership, and Merger Control Verhandlungsmacht und Gewerkschaftswettbewerb Evidence production in merger control: the role of remedies Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies Gegenstandsbereiche der Normung Gegenstandsbereiche der Normung : ein Gutachten im Auftrag des Deutschen Fördervereins zur Stärkung der Forschung zur Normung und Standardisierung e.V. (FNS) Structural remedies as a signalling device Structural Remedies as a Signalling Device The Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices The Nash Bargaining Solution in Vertical Relations With Linear Input Prices Verhandlungsmacht und Gewerkschaftswettbewerb Verhandlungsmacht und Gewerkschaftswettbewerb Multiunion Bargaining: Tariff Plurality and Tariff Competition Die Sektoruntersuchung des Bundeskartellamts zur Nachfragemacht im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel - Ein Kommentar aus ökonomischer Perspektive Die wettbewerbsrechtliche Zulässigkeit von Meistbegünstigungsklauseln auf Buchungsplattformen am Beispiel von HRS Full versus partial collusion among brands and private label producers Full Versus Partial Collusion Among Brands and Private Label Producers Merger remedies in oligopoly under a consumer welfare standard Merger Remedies in Oligopoly Under a Consumer Welfare Standard Multi-union bargaining : tariff plurality and tariff competition Multi-Union Bargaining: Tariff Plurality and Tariff Competition Raising rivals' costs through buyer power Raising Rivals' Costs Through Buyer Power Supplier fixed costs and retail market monopolization Supplier fixed costs and retail market monopolization Supplier Fixed Costs and Retail Market Monopolization Bargaining Power in Manufacturer-Retailer Relationships How to counter union power? Equilibrium mergers in international oligopoly Input price discrimination (bans), entry and welfare Input Price Discrimination (Bans), Entry and Welfare Inter-Format Competition Among Retailers - The Role of Private Label Products in Market Delineation Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeover, and merger control Passive Partial Ownership, Sneaky Takeovers, and Merger Control Wettbewerbsprobleme im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel An equilibrium analysis of efficiency gains from mergers An Equilibrium Analysis of Efficiency Gains from Mergers Nemo omnibus placet: exzessive Regulierung und staatliche Willkür Nemo Omnibus Placet: Exzessive Regulierung und staatliche Willkür The effects of remedies on merger activity in oligopoly The Effects of Remedies on Merger Activity in Oligopoly Unionization structures in international oligopoly Unionization Structures in International Oligopoly

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Katalog der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek

Christian Wey (1967-)

Resale price maintenance in a successive monopoly model

Why “energy price brakes” encourage moral hazard, raise energy prices, and reinforce energy savings

Why “Energy Price Brakes” Encourage Moral Hazard, Raise Energy Prices, and Reinforce Energy Savings

A bargaining perspective on vertical integration

A Bargaining Perspective on Vertical Integration

Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies

Evidence Production in Merger Control : The Role of Remedies

On the social welfare effects of runner-up mergers in concentrated markets

On the Social Welfare Effects of Runner-up Mergers in Concentrated Markets

Third-degree price discrimination in oligopoly when markets are covered

Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly When Markets Are Covered

Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power

Multi-Product Bargaining, Bundling, and Buyer Power

Flexibility in wage setting under the threat of relocation

Flexibility in Wage Setting Under the Threat of Relocation

One-stop shopping behavior, buyer power, and upstream merger incentives

One-Stop Shopping Behavior, Buyer Power, and Upstream Merger Incentives

Uncertain merger synergies, passive partial ownership, and merger control

Uncertain Merger Synergies, Passive Partial Ownership, and Merger Control

Verhandlungsmacht und Gewerkschaftswettbewerb

Evidence production in merger control: the role of remedies

Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies

Gegenstandsbereiche der Normung

Gegenstandsbereiche der Normung : ein Gutachten im Auftrag des Deutschen Fördervereins zur Stärkung der Forschung zur Normung und Standardisierung e.V. (FNS)

Structural remedies as a signalling device

Structural Remedies as a Signalling Device

The Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices

The Nash Bargaining Solution in Vertical Relations With Linear Input Prices

Verhandlungsmacht und Gewerkschaftswettbewerb

Verhandlungsmacht und Gewerkschaftswettbewerb

Multiunion Bargaining: Tariff Plurality and Tariff Competition

Die Sektoruntersuchung des Bundeskartellamts zur Nachfragemacht im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel - Ein Kommentar aus ökonomischer Perspektive

Die wettbewerbsrechtliche Zulässigkeit von Meistbegünstigungsklauseln auf Buchungsplattformen am Beispiel von HRS

Full versus partial collusion among brands and private label producers

Full Versus Partial Collusion Among Brands and Private Label Producers

Merger remedies in oligopoly under a consumer welfare standard

Merger Remedies in Oligopoly Under a Consumer Welfare Standard

Multi-union bargaining : tariff plurality and tariff competition

Multi-Union Bargaining: Tariff Plurality and Tariff Competition

Raising rivals' costs through buyer power

Raising Rivals' Costs Through Buyer Power

Supplier fixed costs and retail market monopolization

Supplier fixed costs and retail market monopolization

Supplier Fixed Costs and Retail Market Monopolization

Bargaining Power in Manufacturer-Retailer Relationships

How to counter union power? Equilibrium mergers in international oligopoly

Input price discrimination (bans), entry and welfare

Input Price Discrimination (Bans), Entry and Welfare

Inter-Format Competition Among Retailers - The Role of Private Label Products in Market Delineation

Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeover, and merger control

Passive Partial Ownership, Sneaky Takeovers, and Merger Control

Wettbewerbsprobleme im Lebensmitteleinzelhandel

An equilibrium analysis of efficiency gains from mergers

An Equilibrium Analysis of Efficiency Gains from Mergers

Nemo omnibus placet: exzessive Regulierung und staatliche Willkür

Nemo Omnibus Placet: Exzessive Regulierung und staatliche Willkür

The effects of remedies on merger activity in oligopoly

The Effects of Remedies on Merger Activity in Oligopoly

Unionization structures in international oligopoly

Unionization Structures in International Oligopoly