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Dominique Lepelley (1951-)

Name	Dominique Lepelley
Time	1951- (Date of birth and death)
Place	Frankreich
Gender	männlich
Variant	D. Lepelley Dominique Charles Roger Lepelley
Related	Université de Caen
Further information	Centre d'économie et de management de l'océan Indien (CEMOI), Fac. de Droit et d'Économie, Univ. de La Réunion, La Réunion, France CREME URA CNRS
Record type	Person
GND-Identifier	170444848
Record ID	170444848
Involved in show all Comparing the manipulability of approval, evaluative and plurality voting with trichotomous preferences Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections Comparing Two Ways for Eliminating Candidates in Three-Alternative Elections Using Sequential Scoring Rules The theoretical Shapley–Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting Elections, Voting Rules and Paradoxical Outcomes The impact of dependence among voters’ preferences with partial indifference Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election? Voting paradoxes and group coherence : the condorcet efficiency of voting rules Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence : The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members On Some Limitations of the Median Voting Rule Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences Condorcet efficiency of positional voting rules with single-peaked preferences

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Dominique Lepelley (1951-)

Comparing the manipulability of approval, evaluative and plurality voting with trichotomous preferences

Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games

On the Condorcet efficiency of evaluative voting (and other voting rules) with trichotomous preferences

Probabilities of electoral outcomes: from three-candidate to four-candidate elections

Comparing Two Ways for Eliminating Candidates in Three-Alternative Elections Using Sequential Scoring Rules

The theoretical Shapley–Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system

Exploring the effects of national and regional popular vote Interstate compact on a toy symmetric version of the Electoral College: an electoral engineering perspective

Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules

The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting

Elections, Voting Rules and Paradoxical Outcomes

The impact of dependence among voters’ preferences with partial indifference

Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections

Should voters be required to rank candidates in an election?

Voting paradoxes and group coherence : the condorcet efficiency of voting rules

Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence : The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules

On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members

On Some Limitations of the Median Voting Rule

Voting Rules, Manipulability and Social Homogeneity

Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates

Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition

The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences

Condorcet efficiency of positional voting rules with single-peaked preferences